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Abstract
This Note argues that the optional inclusion of the development risks defense in Member State
legislation undermines the Products Liability Directive by impeding harmonization of products
liability laws in the Community. Part I sets forth the background and content of the Products
Liability Directive. Part II discusses the implementation of the Products Liability Directive in
Member State legislation. Part III argues that the optional nature of the development risks defense
undermines the intent of the Directive. This Note concludes that the development risks defense
should be mandatory in order to establish uniform products liability laws in the Member States.
NOTE
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE: A
MANDATORY DEVELOPMENT RISKS DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the European Community (the "EC" or the
"Community") recognized a need for a uniform products lia-
bility law to regulate trade and to ensure continual develop-
ment of new production methods.' Subsequently, in 1985, the
Council of Ministers of the European Communities (the
"Council") promulgated the Council Directive on the Approxi-
mation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provi-
sions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products (the "Products Liability Directive" or the "Direc-
tive"). 2 The Products Liability Directive makes certain de-
fenses available to producers of goods.' One such defense,
known as the development risks defense or the state of the art
defense, provides that a producer shall not be liable if the pro-
ducer shows that it did not possess the scientific or technical
knowledge to discover the defect prior to circulation of the
product.' The Products Liability Directive, however, permits a
Member State to choose whether it wants to incorporate the
development risks defense into its national legislation.5
This Note argues that the optional inclusion of the devel-
opment risks defense in Member State legislation undermines
the Products Liability Directive by impeding harmonization of
products liability laws in the Community. Part I sets forth the
background and content of the Products Liability Directive.
1. See REPORT OF THE LEGAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, 1979-1980 EUR. PARL. Doc.
(COM No. 71) 2, 12 (1979) [hereinafter LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT].
2. OJ. L 210/29 (1985) [hereinafter Products Liability Directive].
3. Id. art. 7, OJ. L 210/29, at 31.
4. Id. art. 7(e), O.J. L 210/29, at 31.
5. Id. art. 15(l)(b), O.J. L 210/29, at 32. Article 15(l)(b) provides that
(e]ach Member State may by way of derogation from Article 7(e) maintain
or, subject to the procedure set out in paragraph 2 of this Article, provide in
this legislation that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the prod-
uct into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be
discovered.
Id.
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Part II discusses the implementation of the Products Liability
Directive in Member State legislation. Part III argues that the
optional nature of the development risks defense undermines
the intent of the Directive. This Note concludes that the devel-
opment risks defense should be mandatory in order to estab-
lish uniform products liability laws in the Member States.
I. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
A. Background and Policy Considerations
Prior to the enactment of the Products Liability Directive,
the only harmonization of international products liability laws
consisted of a convention governing conflict of laws problems
in products liability suits. 6 Consequently, the Commission of
the European Communities (the "Commission") produced a
preliminary internal draft for products liability in 1974 and a
second draft in 1975. On September 9, 1976, the Commission
started the formal legislative process by proposing a Directive
Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning
Liability for Defective Products (the "Proposed Directive") 7 to
promote free movement of goods within the Community.8
Several factors provided the impetus for this Commission
6. Conference de La Haye de Droit International Priv6, Actes et Documents de
la douzieme session du 2 au 21 octobre 1972, Tome III, Responsabilit6 du Fait des
Produits, Acte final 246-50 (1974); see Resse, Further Comments on the Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 311 (1978). The
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability addressed the conflict
of laws regarding products liability law. See id. at 311. The United States proposed
the convention because it would lead to greater certainty, predictability, and uni-
formity in products liability law. See id. The United States also proposed that the
plaintiff choose the forum. See id. at 312. The convention, however, did not include
the U.S. view and cited strict requirements for choice of law in articles 4 to 7. See id.
at 31213.
. 7. Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liabil-
ity for Defective Products, OJ. C 241/9 (1976) [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
8. See id.; Amendment of the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Mem-
ber States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, Oj. C 271/3 (1979) [herein-
after Amended Proposal]. The Commission's amended proposal stated that
the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the liability
of the producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of his products is
necessary, because the divergences may distort competition in the common
market; whereas rules of liability which vary in severity lead to differing costs
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proposal and for a uniform products liability law. A producer
that exports its product into another Member State subjects
itself to the legislation of that Member State.9 Thus, the Com-
mission noted that a difference in products liability laws would
restrain the free flow of goods from one Member State to an-
other Member State with more stringent products liability leg-
islation. to
The Commission also recognized several other problems
if different products liability laws existed among the Member
States. First, the Commission feared that disparate products
liability laws would distort competition in the Community."'
In addition, divergent products liability laws would lead to dif-
ferences in producers' costs.' 2  The Commission sought to
solve these problems by introducing liability irrespective of
fault, or strict liability.13 By introducing liability irrespective of
fault, the Commission proposed a manner in which to achieve
adequate consumer protection.' 4
On July 13, 1978, the Economic and Social Committee of
the European Communities (the "Economic and Social Com-
mittee" or the "Committee") expressed its support for the
Proposed Directive. 15 The Economic and Social Committee
for industry in the various Member States and in particular for producers in
different Member States who are in competition with one another.
Id.; see LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 23; see Orban, Products Liability: A
Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 342, 400 (1978).
9. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
10. Amended Proposal, supra note 8, at 4. The Commission stated that "the free
movement of goods within the common market may be influenced by divergences in
laws." Id.; see LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
11. Proposed Directive, supra note 7, O.J. C 241/9, at 9.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approxima-
tion of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, O.J. C 114/16 (1978). The Economic
and Social Committee of the European Communities (the "Economic and Social
Committee") is an ancillary institution that advises the European Community. See D.
LASOK & J. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 235
(1987). The Economic and Social Committee, formulated under the terms of Arti-
cles 193 and 198 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the
"EEC Treaty"), consists of 188 members who represent producers, farmers, trans-
port carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professionals, and representatives of the
general public. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
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considered the need for more expedient remedies for persons
injured by defective products and discussed ways that Member
States would benefit from the implementation of such reme-
dies.' 6 The Committee also expressed a need for an appor-
tionment of costs of the damages awarded by these remedies.' 7
The Committee expressed concern that it would be unfair for
consumers alone to bear potential price increases caused by
damage costs, particularly if such expenses would have serious
social and economic effects on consumers.' The Committee,
moreover, suggested that the Proposed Directive would elimi-
nate or reduce the number of defective products on the market
without disturbing the marketing of safe products.' 9 Finally,
the Committee contended that the enactment of a directive
would enable the Member States to follow developments in the
field of products liability law on both a national and interna-
tional level.2°
When the proposal came to the European Parliament for
review and its advisory opinion, the Legal Affairs Committee of
the European Parliament (the "Legal Affairs Committee") con-
sidered the views expressed by the Economic and Social Com-
mittee and, in 1979, presented its endorsement of the Pro-
posed Directive. 2' The Legal Affairs Committee emphasized
the need for the implementation of strict liability to counter
the difficulty, in certain instances, of procuring proof of fault
without access to a producer's production documents.22
1957, arts. 193 & 198, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 3
(1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; D. LSOK &J. BRIDGE, supra, at 235. The Council of
Ministers appoints the members of the Economic and Social Committee after consul-
tation with the Commission. EEC Treaty, supra, arts. 193 & 198; see D. LASOK & J.
BRIDGE, supra, at 235-36. The opinions of the Economic and Social Committee are
not binding, but may be more influential than the opinions of the European Parlia-
ment because Committee members are involved in activities likely to be affected by
Community policies. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra, at 236.
16. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approxima-
tion of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, O.J. C 114/16 (1978).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See generally LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1.
22. Id. at 24. Furthermore, commentators argued that
[l]iability irrespective of fault does not burden the producer to an unjustified
extent. Normally he can divide the costs of damage passed on to him as a
1990-1991]
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In addition, the Legal Affairs Committee reiterated the
need to enhance free movement of goods within the common
market.23 The Legal Affairs Committee pointed out that diver-
gences between the laws of the various Member States caused
purchasers to buy products in those countries where the con-
sumers were best protected against damage and financial
1oss.24 Similarly, the Legal Affairs Committee noted that man-
ufacturers of end-products purchased semi-finished goods in
those countries where the producer liability was the greatest. 25
Finally, the Committee on the Environment, Public
Health, and Consumer Protection of the European Parliament
emphasized that consumers, as opposed to producers, would
be less likely to learn of new technological changes and devel-
opments.26 As a result, consumers would be unaware of the
producer's identity or the reliability of new products.2 7 Thus,
without strict liability laws consumers would find it difficult to
obtain compensation for defective products.28
result of liability being made independent of fault among all users or con-
sumers of products free of defects from the same range, or of his production
as a whole, by including the expense incurred (payment of damages or pay-
ment of insurance premiums) in his general production costs and in his pric-
ing of the goods. Thus, all consumers bear the costs of the damage to a
reasonable extent.
Orban, supra note 8, at 400-01.
23. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 31-32; see Amended Proposal, supra
note 8 (discussing Commission's views on common market).
24. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 31. The Legal Affairs Committee endorsed the Commission's propo-
sal for adequate consumer protection. Id.; see Amended Proposal, supra note 8, at 4.
After consideration of the Commission's proposal, the Legal Affairs Committee justi-
fied the adoption of liability irrespective of fault. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 11; Amended Proposal, supra note 8, at 4. The European Parliament ad-
vised that a producer "is able, by careful organization and supervision of production
to minimize the risk of damage or injury. He has the easiest access to information
and evidence as to whether goods were defective when they were put on the market."
Id.
27. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
28. Id. In its proposal to the European Parliament, the Commission stated that
imposing liability
on the part of the producer irrespective of fault ensures an appropriate solu-
tion to this problem in an age of increasing technicality, because he can
include the expenditure which he incurs to cover this liability in his produc-
tion costs when calculating the price and therefore divide it among all con-
sumers of products which are of the same type but free from defects.
Amended Proposal, supra note 8, at 4.
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The Council substantially amended the Commission's
1979 proposal, apparently taking into account the views of the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Commit-
tee. 29 After six years of deliberations, the Council of Ministers
approved the final version of the Directive on July 25, 1985.5o
B. Directive's Content
The final version of the Directive represents a progression
of change. The original text proposed by the Commission in
1976 was amended by the Commission."' The final Products
Liability Directive was formulated and approved in 1985.32
1. The Implementation of Strict Liability
Differences in national products liability provisions cre-
ated the need for the imposition of strict liability.33 Article 1 of
the Directive therefore mandates the implementation of strict
liability among the Member States 4.3  The implementation of
strict liability created a great change in products liability law
throughout the Community. Prior to the promulgation of the
Directive, only three Member States imposed producer liability
without fault.3 5 In all other Member States, liability arose from
negligence. In some Member States, a consumer could re-
cover damages only after proving that the producer caused the
product to be defective.3 6 Other Member States presumed
fault on the part of the manufacturer, allowing the manufac-
turer an opportunity for rebuttal.3 7
29. Compare Amended Proposal, supra note 8 with Products Liability Directive,
supra note 2.
30. See Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, O.J. L 210/29, at 29.
31. See Proposed Directive, supra note 7; Amended Proposal, supra note 8.
32. See generally Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, O.J. L 210/29.
33. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
34. See Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, Oj. L 210/29, at 30.
Article 1 states that "[t]he producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in
his product." Id.
35. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra, note 1, at 12. The products liability laws in
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg had always imposed strict liability on producers
of defective products. Id.
36. Id. The product liability laws in Italy and Germany placed the burden of
proof on the consumer until the products liability law was reversed in 1968. Id. Den-
mark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and, since 1968, Germany pre-
sumed fault but allowed exculpating evidence to be admitted. Id.
37. Id. France, Belgium, and Luxembourg adopted a system of strict liability
4831990-1991]
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According to the Legal Affairs Committee, strict. liability
was imposed to protect consumers.3 8 The Legal Affairs Com-
mittee argued that the producer is in the best position to know
whether goods are defective when placed on the market be-
cause producers have the easiest access to information. 9 Fur-
thermore, the Committee noted that a producer can foresee
high insurance premiums and can calculate the price of its
products to offset the high costs. 40
2. Options Set Forth in the Directive
The Directive allows Member States to take different posi-
tions on three issues as a result of compromises necessary to
secure its adoption. 4' The optional provisions set forth in the
Directive relate to the development risks defense, the setting
of financial limits,42 and the possible coverage of primary agri-
excepting contrary evidence to repudiate the presumed fault. ld.; see Amended Pro-
posal, supra note 8, at 5. The Commission stated that
the producer is not liable where the defective product was put into circula-
tion against his will or when it became defective only after he had put it into
circulation and accordingly the defect did not originate in the production
process; the presumption nevertheless is to the contrary unless he furnishes
proof as to the exonerating circumstances.
Id.
38. Id. at 11. The second consideration of the Directive states that "liability
without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the
problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the
risks inherent in modern technological production." Product Liability Directive,
supra note 2, O.J. L 210/29, at 29. Some commentators have noted that strict liability
promotes loss spreading, discourages the consumption of hazardous products, and
encourages the production of safety products. See, e.g., Niles, Defining the Limits of
Liability: A Legal and Political Analysis of the European Community Products Liability Direc-
tive, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 729, 758 (1985).
39. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
40. Id.
41. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 15, O.J. L 210/29, at 32; see
supra note 5 (containing text of article 15).
42. The final draft placed a threshold of 500 ECUs for property damages in
order to avoid excessive litigation. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 9,
O.J. L 210/29, at 31. The Products Liability Directive sets out fixed liability limits
that cannot be reduced or increased by national laws. Id. art. 16, Oj. L 210/29, at
32; see supra note 40 (containing text of article 16).
The Proposed Directive noted that "the equivalent in national currency shall be
determined by applying the conversion rate prevailing on the day preceding the date
on which the amount of compensation is finally fixed." Proposed Directive, supra note
7, art. 7, OJ. C 241/9, at 12; see Orban, supra note 8, at 405 (discussing new Euro-
pean unit of account).
The Directive fails to define a limit on a producer's total liability. Article 16(1)
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cultural products.43 Commentators argue that the optional na-
ture of certain provisions within the Directive promotes dishar-
mony in the Community and undermines the intent of the Di-
rective.44 Others favor an optional development risks defense
to maintain conformity with existing products liability laws in
some Member States.45
3. Definition of "Products" and "Producer"
Article 2 of the Products Liability Directive defines "prod-
uct" as anything moveable. 46 The Directive specifically ex-
cludes game and primary agricultural products, but it leaves
open the possibility of their inclusion in individual Member
States' legislation.4 7
For the purposes of the Products Liability Directive, the
manufacturer is considered a producer if the manufacturer
puts its trademark on a product.48 Where the producer of a
states that "[any Member State may provide that a producer's total liability for dam-
age resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by identical items with the
same defect shall be limited to an amount which may not be less than 70 million
ECU." Id. art. 16(1), 0J. L 210/29, at 32.
43. Id. arts. 2, 7, 15, 16, 0J. L 210/29, at 30-32. Article 2 of the Directive ex-
empts primary agricultural products and game from the scope of the Directive. Id.
art. 2, 0J. L 210/29, at 30. However, article 15 of the Directive provides that the
exemption for primary agricultural products can be withdrawn by individual Member
States in their implementing legislation. Id. art. 15, OJ. L 210/29, at 32; see supra
note 5 (containing text of article 15); see also Products Liability Directive, supra note 2,
art. 7(e), 0J. L 210/29, at 31; id. art. 16, 0J. L 210/29, at 32.
44. See, e.g., Thieffry, EEC Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective Products: Imple-
mentation and Practice, in EEC STRICT LIABILITY IN 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILTY
RuLEs 9, 48 (P. Thieffry & G. Whitehead eds. 1989).
45. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing Luxembourg's failure
to adopt development risks defense).
46. See Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 2, 0J. L 210/29, at 30.
47. Id., consideration 15 0J. L 210/29, at 30. The fifteenth consideration of the
Products Liability Directive states that
since the exclusion of primary agricultural products and game from the
scope of this Directive may be felt, in certain Member States, in view of what
is expected for the protection of consumers, to restrict unduly such protec-
tion, it should be possible for a Member State to extend liability to such
products.
Id. The European Parliament advised that it would be too much of an imposition to
make a producer liable for defects in agricultural, craft, or artistic products because
such products are not manufactured industrially. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note
1, at 17. The classification of products is a discretionary function of the courts. Wau-
tier, European Community, in PRODUCTS LIABILITY, AN INTERNATIONAL MANUAL OF PRAC-
TICE 1.12, at 19 (W. Freedman ed. 1988).
48. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 3, 0.J. L 210/29, at 30-31.
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good cannot be identified, each supplier is identified as the
manufacturer unless the supplier identifies the manufacturer
within a reasonable time.49 The same rule applies to the im-
porter.5 °
4. Defectiveness
Under the Directive, a product's defectiveness is deter-
mined under a "reasonable consumer" standard. 5' Defective-
ness is determined by the absence of safeguards that the public
at large expects, rather than by the product's fitness for use.52
When making a determination of defectiveness, various
factors are considered, including the time at which the product
was put into circulation, the intended use of the product in re-
lation to its actual use, and the presentation of the product.53
49. Id. art. 3(3), OJ. L 210/29, at 31.
50. Id. The Directive further defines a producer as "any person who imports
into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form of distribution in the
course of his business." Id. art. 3(2), Oj. L 210/29, at 31.
51. Id. art. 6(1)(b), Oj. L 210/29, at 31.
52. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, at 29. The sixth consideration of
the Products Liability Directive states that
to protect the physical well-being and property of the consumer, the defec-
tiveness of the product should be determined by reference not to its fitness
for use but to the lack of the safety which the public at large is entitled to
expect; whereas the safety is assessed by excluding any misuse of the prod-
uct not reasonable under the circumstances.
Id.
A product is defective if it differs from what is considered to be normal. Wau-
tier, European Attempts on Harmonizing Laws Related to Products Liability, in PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, A MANUAL OF PRACTICE 2.431, at 49 (H. Stucki & P. Altenburger eds.
1981). In addition, the Directive considers for purposes of defectiveness the presen-
tation of the product as well as the time when the producer put the product into
circulation. Id. 2.432-2.433, at 50; see Products Liability Directive, supra note 2,
art. 6, OJ. L 210/29, at 31. The consumer's use of a product in a manner that does
not conform with the product's purpose does not discharge the producer from liabil-
ity under every circumstance. Wautier, supra, 2.433, at 50.
For example, a manufacturer of children's toys cannot be discharged from
his liability by attaching a notice to the product warning children not to put
the toys into their mouths because of the toxic nature of the paint. The
producer has a duty not to use toxic paint for children's toys, even if there
are no legal provisions or manufacturing standards prohibiting the use of
such paint.
Id. at 51.
53. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, O.J. L 210/29, at 31. The
definition of a product's defectiveness as defined by the Directive is an example of
how the definitions within the Products Liability Directive have changed since it was
first introduced. Compare Proposed Directive, supra note 7, art. 4, Oj. C 241/9, at 11
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The Legal Affairs Committee advised that older products are
not as safe as newer ones because of the higher risks associated
with older products.54 Furthermore, the Committee stated
that a product should only be considered defective if the prod-
uct was being used for its intended purpose.55 Finally, the
Legal Affairs Committee advised that the intended use of the
product is a decision made by the consumer, not the pro-
ducer. 6
5. Joint and Several Liability and Contributory Negligence
The Products Liability Directive imposes severe penalties
on producers for marketing defective products.5 7 Article 5 of
the Directive provides that producers may be jointly and sever-
ally liable for the same damages if liability exists, and a con-
sumer may claim full compensation for injury from any one of
the producers.5 8
The Legal Affairs Committee noted that the 1976 draft of
the Products Liability Directive excluded contributory negli-
gence claims from the scope of the Directive. 59 The Commis-
with LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. Article 4 of the Proposed Directive
states that "[a] product is defective when it does not provide for persons or property
the safety which a person is entitled to expect." Proposed Directive, supra note 7, art.
4, O.J. C 241/9, at 11. The amended text as proposed by the European Parliament
stated that
a product is defective when, being used for the purpose for which it is ap-
parently intended, it does not provide for persons or property the safety
which a person is entitled to expect, taking into account all the circum-
stances, including its presentation and the time at which it was put into cir-
culation.
LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
54. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
55. 1&
56. Id.
57, Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, arts. 1 & 5, OJ. L 210/29, at 30 &
31. For example, the Directive's implementation of strict liability, as well as joint and
several liability, places difficulties on producers of defective products. Id.
58. Id. art. 5, OJ. L 210/29, at 31. This provision frees a party from initiating
costly and inefficient proceedings against all of the producers in separate trials. Or-
ban, supra note 8, at 402. The laws of the individual Member States govern indemni-
fication of the party who pays the damages in full by the other parties that are jointly
and severally liable. Id.
59. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 37. The Consumer Protection Com-
mittee explained the rationale behind the omission of contributory negligence:
It is difficult to see how comprehensive the draft directive is intended to be.
Since a- number of its provisions are already in force in some Member States,
it seems reasonable for it to cover all possible aspects of the problem of
487
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sion, however, proposed that contributory negligence should
be taken into account °60 As a result, article 8 of the final Direc-
tive provides that contributory negligence of an injured party
may be invoked to reduce producer liability. 6' Because the Di-
rective contains no clear standards addressing contributory
negligence, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
hypothesized that article 8 will cause decisions on contributory
negligence claims to vary from one jurisdiction to another, re-
sulting in different products liability laws among the Member
States.62 One commentator theorized that the Directive en-
courages injured persons to seek the defendant with the ability
to pay the highest compensation as well as to "forum shop" for
the jurisdiction in which plaintiffs receive the largest monetary
recoveries. 6
6. Defenses
The Products Liability Directive seeks to impose more
stringent standards on producers, while granting those produ-
cers a number of defenses.64 Article 7(e) defines the "state of
the art" or development risks defense, which states that if a
producer did not possess the scientific and technical knowl-
consumer liability, and not to appear one-sided by omitting a safeguard
which will be important to producers. The directive should however avoid
treating slight inadvertency of the victim as contributory negligence; and in
cases of personal injury probably only gross negligence or intentional con-
duct should be taken into account.
Id.
60. Amended Proposal, supra note 8, at 5. In addition to contributory negli-
gence, the Commission added an optional inclusion of compensation for pain and
suffering. Id.; LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
61. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 8, O.J. L 210/29, at 31. Article
8(2) of the Products Liability Directive provides that "[t]he liability of the producer
may be reduced or disallowed when, having regard to all the circumstances, the dam-
age is caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person or
any person for whom the injured person is responsible." Id. art. 8(2), O.J. L 210/29,
at 31.
62. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-27.
63. Simon, Observations des Professionnels sur l'introduction en Droit Frangais de la Di-
rective Europienne la Responsabiliti du Fait des Produits Defectueux (Professional Observa-
tions on the Introduction in French Law of the European Directive on the Responsi-
bility of Defective Products), at 198 (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal office).
64. See Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 7, OJ. L 210/29, at 31; see
also id. art. 15, O.J. L 210/29, at 32 (discussing optional nature of development risks
defense).
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edge to learn of the defect at the time the product was placed
into circulation, the producer will not be held liable for injuries
and damages resulting from this defect.65 Discovery of the de-
fect in a product must have been absolutely impossible. Arti-
cle 15(b) of the Directive, however, allows Member States to
exclude the development risks defense from their national leg-
islation at their option.
The Directive provides several other defenses. Pursuant
to article 7 (a), if the producer can prove that it did not put the
product into circulation and did not manufacture the product
for sale or distribution, the producer is relieved of liability.68
Furthermore, article 7(b) provides that a producer is not liable
for defects arising after the product enters circulation.69 Arti-
cle 7(c) exonerates a producer from liability if it neither manu-
factured the product for sale nor distributed the product in the
course of its business. 70 Finally, article 7(d) of the Products
Liability Directive excuses producers from liability if the defect
is the result of manufacturing the product to comply with
mandatory regulations issued by Member States.7 '
65. Id art. 7(e), O.J. L 210/29, at 31.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see id. art. 15(l)(b), OJ. L 210/29, at 32 (discussing' optional nature of
development risks defense); supra note 5 (containing text of article 15).
68. Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, 'art. 7(a), O.J. L 210/29, at 31.
69. Id. art. 7(b), O.J. L 210/29, at 31.
70. Id. art. 7(c), O.J. L 210/29, at 31.
71. Id. art. 7(d), O.J. L 210/29, at 31. Despite the language of article 7(d), if a
product complies with the legislation of a Member State, it does not make the prod-
uct free of all defects. Boger, The Harmonization of European Products Liability Law, 7
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 30-31 (1984). The Directive's definition of a defect overrides
any definition set forth in Member State legislation. Id. at 31. The Directive allows
the Member States to choose their own methods of implementing the Directive into
their national legislation, but Member States must adhere to the Community's re-
quirements regarding the substantive provisions of the Products Liability Directive.
Id.
Other aspects of the Directive relate to limitation periods. The Products Liabil-
ity Directive states that an injured party has three years to bring suit. Products Liabil-
ity Directive, supra note 2, art. 10(1), O.J. L 210/29, at 31. The tenth consideration
states that "a uniform period of limitation for the bringing of action for compensa-
tion is in the interests both of the injured person and of the producer." Id., consider-
ation 10, O.J. L 210/29, at 29. The Directive provides for a three-year limitation
period because this period gives the victim the time to bring an action against the
producer in another Member State. Id. art. 10(1), O.J. L 210/29, at 31; see Orban,
supra note 8, at 406. In addition, an injured party has ten years to initiate proceed-
ings from the date on which the producer first placed the product into circulation.
Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 11, OJ. L 210/29, at 32. The reason-
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II. MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DIRECTIVE
Member States have been slow to comply with the Prod-
ucts Liability Directive because of the controversial nature of
article 7(e), the development risks defense.72 Eventually, most
Member States are likely to implement the development risks
defense into their national legislation. 73 Luxembourg, how-
ever, has chosen not to adopt the development risks defense
into its national legislation, and France and Belgium are likely
to follow.
74
A. Member States Adopting the Development Risks Defense
The majority of Member States have chosen to implement
the development risks defense into their national legislation. 75
ing for this type of limit was stated by Mr. Richard Burke at a conference on products
liability:
Without such a term to his liabilities, the producer would be faced with in-
creasing difficulties. The relevant records would be more and more difficult
to trace, especially where a company had changed hands; it would be more
and more difficult to distinguish defect from wear and tear; and the pro-
ducer would have to insure in perpetuity.
Speech by Richard Burke, London Conference on Product Liability 6 (Feb. 28, 1980)
(copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinafter Burke
Speech].
72. See Thieffry, supra note 44, at 28.
73. See EEC STRICT LIABILITY IN 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES 207
(P. Thieffry & G. Whitehead eds. 1989).
74. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing Luxembourg law); infra
notes 130-37 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that Belgium will not
adopt development risks defense); infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing likelihood that France will not adopt development risks defense).
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing countries likely to im-
plement development risks defense). Greece and Italy were among the first Member
States to implement the development risks defense into their national legislation.
Greece changed its products liability law to conform with the Directive by adopting a
ministerial decision. No. A.P.B. 7535/1077 (Mar. 31, 1988) (Greece); see Doing Busi-
ness in Europe, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 43-851. Prior to the enactment of the
Greek law, a consumer had to prove fault on the part of the producer to recover for
defective products under section 914 of the Greek Civil Code on Torts. See Letter
from Peter Dracopoulous, Attorney at the law offices of Karatzas & Perakis in Athens,
Greece (Jan. 11, 1990) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
Italy was the third Member State to implement the Directive into its national
legislation. See Thieffry, supra note 44, at 35. On May 24, 1988, the Italian legislature
passed a Presidential Decree adopting the development risks defense in concurrence
with the Products Liability Directive. D.P.R. 24 magio 1988, n. 224 (Italy); see Doing
Business in Europe, Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 53-500. Other Member States that
have adopted the development risks defense are Portugal, Denmark, and Germany.
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Currently, only three Member States are likely to exclude the
defense from their products liability laws.76 Although not
every Member State has actually changed its national legisla-
tion to comply with the Directive, most have at least drafted
products liability legislation in compliance with the Directive."
1. Ireland
Although Ireland has been extremely slow in its imple-
mentation of the Directive, the Confederation of Irish Industry
(the "CII") stated that Ireland intends to adopt the develop-
ment risks defense into its national legislation. 78  The Irish
Minister for Industry and Commerce argues that the absence
of a development risks defense would create major problems
for producers.79 Such problems include high insurance costs
and stifling of innovation created by producers' fear of liability
in developing new products. 80
In light of these arguments, it appears that Ireland will in-
clude the development risks defense in its product liability leg-
islation upon implementation of the Directive.8 '
See Decreto-Lei No. 383/89, art. 5(e) (Nov. 6, 1989) (Port.); Product Liability Act, No.
371, art. 7.1.4, at 3 (June 7, 1989) (Den.); Lousanoff& Moessle, German Products Lia-
bility Law and the Impact of the EC Council Directive, 22 INr'L LAW. 669 (1988).
76. See infra notes 121-50 and accompanying text (discussing products liability
laws in Luxembourg, Belgium, and France).
77. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text (discussing products liability
draft legislation in Spain); infra notes 139-50 (discussing draft legislation in France).
78. Confederation of Irish Industry (the "CII") Newsletter, Wider Responsibilities
Under Product Liability Directive, Jan. 12, 1988, at 2, col. 1. The CII is a privately-
funded lobbyist group representing industry in trade, economics, finance, taxation,
and planning and development. Telephone interview with Joan Barry, CII Informa-
tion Officer (Sept. 11, 1990). Albert Reynolds, the Irish Minister for Industry and
Commerce, noted that Ireland must comply with the Directive in order to maintain a
cost competitive market. Speech by Albert Reynolds, Minister for Industry and Com-
merce, at 6 (Oct. 30, 1987) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal of-
fice) [hereinafter Reynolds Speech]. Minister Reynolds argued that
every producer wants to avoid having claims taken against him. The best
way of doing so is to ensure that proper quality control systems are in opera-
tion.... I cannot accept that a dramatic increase in claims should automati-
cally follow or that there should be a significant increase in insurance premi-
ums.
Id.
79. Reynolds Speech, supra note 78, at 4.
80. Id. Innovation will be stifled by the lack of new products entering the mar-
ket. Id. The absence of new products will arise from the producer's fear that some-
thing unforeseen will go wrong. Id.
81. Set CII Newsletter, Nov. 29, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
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2. Spain
To date, Spain has not implemented the development
risks defense into its products liability legislation. Before the
Products Liability Directive, Spain based producer liability on
fault, with the producer bearing the burden of proof.8 2 The
reform of Spanish law pursuant to the terms of the Products
Liability Directive is currently under discussion. As of yet,
Spain has only draft legislation regarding strict products liabil-
ity.83
Several factors account for Spain's delay in adopting the
Products Liability Directive. Spain did not become a member
of the EC untilJanuary 1, 1986.84 As a result, the Spanish gov-
ernment must change a large part of Spain's existing legisla-
tion to comply with EC laws.8 5 In implementing these
changes, the Spanish government has given products liability
reform a low priority. 6
Two pieces of draft legislation, however, include the de-
velopment risks defense.' The first draft was almost identical
to the Products Liability Directive, with the exception of the
inclusion of special strict liability provisions for manufacturers
of pharmaceuticals. 88  The second draft more closely reflects
the Spanish products liability law as it may be formulated. 9
82. See Carlo, Product Liability Law after the European Directive in Spain (Sept.
22-23, 1988) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office). Prior to the
promulgation of the Directive, Spain had a special products liability system, distinct
from the general system as provided by the Spanish Civil Code. See id.
83. Id. at 3.
84. See Treaty of Accession, O.J. L 302/1 (1985) (Spain).
85. See id.
86. Carlo, supra note 82, at 3.
87. Id.; see Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley de Responsabilidad Civil por Da-
fhos Causados por Productos Defectuosos (Proposed Project of the Law of Civil Re-
sponsibility for Damages Caused by Defective Products), art. 6(e), at 4 (prepared by
Professor don Angel Rojo Fernandez), reproduced in Carlo, supra note 82, at app. A
(Jan. 26, 1988) ; Draft of Spanish Products Liability Law, art. 29(e), at 123 (prepared
by Professor R. Bercovitz), reproduced in Carlo, supra note 82, at app. B.
88. Carlo, supra note 82, at 3. The draft proposed by Professor Rojo differs
somewhat from the Products Liability Directive. Id. The Spanish draft includes 1)
certain agricultural products; 2) the extension of the legal concept of producer to the
producers of agricultural products or raw materials; and 3) the establishment of a
system of strict liability for the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals similar to that es-
tablished in Germany. Id.
89. Id. Professor Bercovitz is responsible for the second draft of the Spanish
products liability law. Id. Article 29(e) of the second draft includes the development
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The second draft, unlike the Directive, extends responsibility
for loss and damages to faulty services as well as defective
products.90 In addition, the second draft includes the concept
of damages for pain and suffering and removes the lower
threshold of 500 ECUs established by the Products Liability
Directive. 91
Despite the delay in the Spanish Parliament, it seems likely
that Spain will adopt the development risks defense in compli-
ance with the Directive.92
3. The Netherlands
The Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (the "Dutch Par-
liament") implemented the development risks defense into its
national legislation on September 13, 1990.93 Prior to the pro-
mulgation of the Directive, the products liability law in the
Netherlands presumed fault on the part of the producer.94
When the Directive was under debate in the Dutch Parliament,
a member of the Partij Van De Arbeid (the "PVDA"), the labor
party in the Netherlands, drafted an amendment opposing the
risks defense as outlined in article 7(e) of the Directive. Draft of Spanish Product
Liability Law, art. 29(e), at 123, reproduced in Carlo, supra note 82, at app. B.
90. Carlo, supra note 82, at 4.
91. Id. at 4; see Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(b), O.J. L 210/29,
at 31. Article 9(b) states that damage means
damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective
product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU, provided that the item of
property:
(i) is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and
(ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or con-
sumption.
This Article shall be without prejudice to national provisions relating to
non-material damage.
Id.
92. Spain will probably include the development risks defense into its national
consumer protection law, but the inclusion of the defense is still under debate.
Carlo, supra note 82, at 5. Spain's slow implementation of the Directive arises from a
conflict existing between the Ministry of Justice, which favors the defense as benefi-
cial to the producer, and the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs, which op-
poses the defense. Id.; see supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Spanish
draft law on products liability adopting development risks defense).
93. See Aanpassing van het Burgerlijk Wetboek aan de richtlijn van de Raad van
de Europese Gemeenschappen inzake de aansprakelijkheid voor produkten met
gebreken (Products Liability Law), No. 487, art. 1407a(e), at 1 (Sept. 13, 1990)
(Neth.). Article 1407a(e) incorporates article 7(e) of the Directive into the Dutch
Civil Code verbatim. See id.
94. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
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development risks defense. 95 In response to this amendment,
the Christen Democratisch Appel (the "CDA"), the conserva-
tive party prevailing in Holland, actively supported the devel-
opment risks defense. 96
The CDA argued that because producers are often igno-
rant of risks created, to hold a producer liable for circum-
stances it is unaware of would be unfair.9 7 The CDA further
argued that exclusion of the development risks defense would
create problems in the calculation of liability insurance. 98 The
CDA stated that because producers are often unaware of the
defects in products, they lack the ability to calculate liability
risks and as a result, they are unable to calculate insurance pre-
miums properly. 99
Furthermore, the CDA argued that because the majority
of Member States plan to adopt the development risks defense,
exclusion of the defense would exacerbate the problem of fo-
rum shopping.100 The CDA noted that multi-national corpora-
tions that sell goods in France, Luxembourg, and Belgium
would be sued in the Member States where the greatest recov-
ery is likely to be obtained.10
B. The United Kingdom: A Controversial Implementation
The United Kingdom complied with the Directive in the
form of the Consumer Protection Act,10 2 which received Royal
95. Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal and the Amendement Van Het Lid
Swildens-Rozendaal (Proposal to Amendment art. 1407a) (May 17, 1989) (Neth.)
[hereinafter Proposal to Dutch Amendment]. Swildens-Rozendaal, a member of the
PVDA, drafted the amendment. The amendment states that "[iln the interests of
good consumer protection there will be no exception made for development risks
liability." Id. (translated into English by John Barney). The PVDA favors consumer
protection. Id.
96. Adaption of the Civil Code to the Directive of the Council of the European
Communities concerning liability for defective products, LTS 1580/86/Dutch/ LC,
1985-1986 Sess., art. 1407a(e) (Second Chamber of the States-General) (Neth.).
97. See Proposal to Dutch Amendment, supra note 95 (discussing CDA's view of
development risks defense).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The CDA further argued that exclusion of the development risks de-
fense would hinder innovation. Id. Producers will fear placing new products on the
market. Id. In turn, this practice will prove to be detrimental to the Dutch economy
and to its place in the international market. Id
102. Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43 (U.K.).
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Assent on May 15, 1987.10- The Consumer Protection Act
adopted the development risks defense in article 4(1)(e), which
provides that a producer exonerates itself from liability if it
proves that it did not possess the scientific and technical
knowledge that a reasonable producer would possess to dis-
cover a defect.'t 4 The Consumer Protection Act thus deviates
from the original defense as set forth in article 7(e) of the
Products Liability Directive.' °5
The development risks defense set forth in the Consumer
103. Id.
104. Id. art. 4(l)(e), at 3. In furtherance of consumer protection, the United
Kingdom proposed an amendment to eliminate the development risks defense with
respect to the pharmaceutical industry. 487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 856 (1987).
This proposal stemmed from the German thalidomide tragedy, which caused an up-
roar over an improperly tested tranquilizer that was sold over the counter. Id. The
Parliament expressed concern over pharmaceutical products that have a devastating
effect on human life. Id.
The thalidomide tragedy caused West Germany to remove the development
risks defense for manufacturers of drugs. Id. The drug thalidomide (marketed under
the trademark Countergen) supposedly represented a new product having unex-
pected troubles. Veed-Cannon, A Practical Perspective on Products Liability in the Euro-
pean Communities, 1982/1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 37, 73. The mar-
ket advertised the drug as a safe tranquilizer but it had not been properly tested. Id.
Mr. Richard Burke, in a London Conference on Products Liability, stated that "it is
unacceptable that consumers should be treated as guinea pigs and bear the risk, with-
out remedy, of defects being discovered during use." Burke Speech, supra note 71, at
9.
Opponents of the amendment to eliminate the defense argued that to exclude
development risks for pharmaceutical products would not hinder tragic incidents.
487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 862 (1987). Mistakes are made in the testing of any
product. Id. Furthermore, pharmaceutical products are tested more thoroughly as a
result of the thalidomide tragedy. Id. at 858. Lord Poritt of the House of Lords
argued that the "proposers of this amendment are suggesting a specific exclusion of
the pharmaceutical profession from the possibility of using a defense that anybody
else can use -the development risks defence- then I suggest to your lordships that
is illogical, unfair, and highly discriminating and very much against the benefit of the
community." Id. at 859. Thus far, Germany is the only Member State to exclude the
development risks defense for pharmaceutical products. See Zekoll, German Products
Liability Act, 37 AM. J. COMp. L. 809, 810 n.6 (1989).
105. Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43, art. 4(1)(e), at 3 (U.K.). Article
4(1)(e) of the Consumer Protection Act changed the wording of the development
risks defense set forth in the Directive. Article 4(1)(e) provides a defense if
the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not
such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in
question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in
his products while they were under his control.
Id. Article 7(e) of the Products Liability Directive states that
[t]he producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves that
the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the
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Protection Act imposes a reasonableness standard less restric-
tive than the standard outlined in article 7(e) of the Direc-
tive.106 One House of Lords member noted that the version of
the defense as stated in article 4(l)(e) is a watered down ver-
sion of the Directive. 0 7 Commentators argue that the content
of the U.K. legislation alters the Directive by introducing in-
dustry standards, thereby reducing the existing law to a variant
product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect
to be discovered.
Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 7(e), O.J. L 210/29, at 31. Because the
United Kingdom is the only Member State to change the wording in the development
risks defense, the Commission has initiated proceedings against the United King-
dom, charging that the United Kingdom insufficiently implemented the Directive.
Letter from Monique Goyens, Legal Advisor to the Bureau Europeen des Unions de
Consommateurs (BEUC) (Oct. 11, 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law
Journal office).
106. 487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 849 (1987); see Consumer Protection Act,
1987, ch. 43, art. 4(1)(e), at 3 (U.K.). Some legislators in the House of Lords prefer
strict compliance with the Directive. 487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 850 (1987).
Lord Morton of the House of Lords inquired hypothetically what would happen if
someone were the only producer of a product. Id. He asked:
[W]here does [the sole producer of a product] go to find a producer?... Is
he the only person who is expected to have discovered the defect? It is easy
for the sole producer to say, 'I did not expect this. I might not be expected
to know this.' Surely it is better to keep the directive, which is in words
which can be understood.
Id.
Because the Consumer Protection Act does not strictly comply with the Products
Liability Directive, the Commission may bring an Article 169 action against the
United Kingdom. See EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 169. Article 169 states that
[ilf the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion on the matter
after requiring such State to submit its comments.
If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion within the
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may refer the matter to the
Court of Justice.
Id.
The Commission has also initiated proceedings against Belgium, France, Ire-
land, and the Netherlands. Bus. INs. Nov. 5, 1990, at 33. These proceedings will be
brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the "Court" or
the "Court ofJustice") in 1991. Id. Spain may still be included in the suit. Id. Com-
missioners initially questioned the products liability legislation in Germany, Italy,
Denmark, and Luxembourg. Id. After an investigation, however, the Commission
took no legal action against these Member States. Id.
107. 487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 849 (1987). The development risks defense
is intended to encourage producers to develop new products and new production
methods for the benefit of the consumer. Id. at 853. If the defense is watered down
too much, producers will not try as hard to develop new products for the consumer's
benefit. Id.
1990-1991] PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
of negligence.1 0 8 These commentators argue that the Direc-
tive allows for clarification of ambiguities by each Member
State, but disallows alteration of its objective."° Furthermore,
they argue that the U.K. legislation imposes a reasonableness
test that conflicts with the Directive's objective of consumer
protection through strict products liability." l0
The Confederation of British Industry (the "CBI")," t on
the other hand, believes that article 4(l)(e) represents a prefer-
able interpretation of the meaning of article 7(e). 12 The CBI
argues that the Directive's wording was unworkable in the con-
text of U.K. legislation."l3 In support of this proposition, the
CBI argued that the wording of article 7(e) was imprecise and
contrary to the original intention of the Directive. 1 4 Thus, the
CBI argued that the wording of article 4(l)(e) more realisti-
cally interprets the intentions of the Directive.' 15
108. Id. at 851; see N.G. Dehn, Attorney at the National Consumer Council,
Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act, 4 (copy on file at the Fordham Intera-
tional Law Journal office).
109. 487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 850 (1987); see Letter from Tony Venables,
Director of the BEUC (Sept. 3, 1987) (discussing ramifications of changing exact
wording of Product Liability Directive) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law
Journal office).
110. Dehn, supra note 108, at 4; see Nedwick, The Development Risk Defence of the
Consumer Protection Act 1987, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 455, 459 (1988).
111. The Confederation of British Industry (the "CBI") is an independent, non-
party political organization that voices industrial concerns to the government. CON-
FEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET 1 (Mar. 1989) (copy on
file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
112. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, PoSIToN PAPER ON THE DEVELOP-
MENT RISKS DEFENSE 10 (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter CBI REPORT]. In support of the
United Kingdom's deviation from the Directive, the House of Lords proposed that
Community directives are often drafted for the benefit of a number of Member
States. 487 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 852 (1987). Article 189 of the EEC Treaty
provides that the result the Directive seeks to achieve is binding, but the method of
implementation is optional within each Member State. See EEC Treaty, supra note 15,
art. 189.
113. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at 10. The House of Lords permitted the
wording of article 4(1)(e) because the policies outlined in the Directive were not con-
sistent with the policies familiar to the U.K. courts and practitioners. 487 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th ser.) 851-52 (1987).
114. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at 10. The CBI interpreted article 7(e) to
exonerate producers only if no individual anywhere in the World could have discov-
ered the defect. Id.
115. Id. at 11.
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C. Member States Rejecting the Development Risks Defense
At present, only one Member State has failed to adopt the
defense." 6 Luxembourg has expressly excluded the develop-
ment risks defense from its national legislation. 1 7 France and
Belgium are likely to follow." 8 Prior to the promulgation of
the Directive, the products liability laws in these Member
States included strict liability but did not provide for a devel-
opment risks defense."19 Because their products liability laws
already complied with the Directive, these Member States are
reluctant to modify their products liability laws to include the
defense. 120
1. Luxembourg
Luxembourg adopted legislation to comply with the Di-
rective on April 21, 1989. 121 TheJudicial Commission, the ju-
dicial committee of Luxembourg's parliament, rejected the de-
velopment risks defense because it feared that the defense
would erode consumer protection and because it found no
116. See Projet de Loi relatif i la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits d6fec-
tueux (Proposed law concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts), Chambre des D~put6s No. 3287 (Mar. 1, 1989) (Lux.); see also RAPPORT GEN-
ERAL DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR L'INT9GRATION EN DROrr FRANgAIS DE LA DIRECTIVE,
POSITION PAPER ON THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE (June 9, 1987) [hereinafter
WORKING GROUP REPORT]; F*DfRATION DEs ENTREPRISES DE BELGIQUE, POSITION PA-
PER ON THE PRODUCTS LIABILrY DIRECTIVE (Apr. 9, 1986) 1hereinafter BELGIAN POSI-
TION PAPER].
117. Loi du 21 avril 1989 relative i la responsabiliti civile du fait des produits
d6fectueux (Law of Apr. 21, 1989 concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of
defective products), DOCUMENT PARLEMENT 3287, SESSION ORDONNANCE 1988-1989
(Lux.).
118. See CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANgAIS, PosIToN PAPER ON DEVEL-
OPMENT RISKS DEFENSE 6 (Oct. 18, 1988) [hereinafter CNPF POSITION PAPER] (dis-
cussing likelihood that France will exclude development risks defense); BELGIAN PO-
SITION PAPER, supra note 116 (discussing likelihood that Belgium will exclude devel-
opment risks defense).
119. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
120. See, e.g., Projet de Loi relatif i la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits
d6fectueux (Proposed law concerning civil liability of manufacturers of defective
products), Chambre des D6put6s, No. 3287, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1988); id. at 4 (Mar. 1,
1989).
121. Loi du 21 avril 1989 relative i la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits
d6fectueux (Law of Apr. 21, 1989 concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of
defective products), DOCUMENT PARLEMENT 3287, SESSION ORDONNANCE 1988-1989
(Lux.).
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precedent in Luxembourg's general law.'2 2 The development
risks defense is unknown in Luxembourg's legal process and
jurisprudence. 2  The Judicial Commission, therefore, op-
posed any modification of Luxembourg's strict liability provi-
sion. 124
The Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce (the "Cham-
ber"), a private group that advises the Luxembourg Parlia-
ment, however, favored the defense and argued that by exclud-
ing the defense, Luxembourg would isolate itself from the rest
of the Member States, resulting in a trade disadvantage vis-d-vis
other states. 125  The Chamber believed that producers must
assume part, but not all, of the responsibility to private con-
sumers injured by defective products.'216 The Chamber also
maintained that exclusion of the defense would inhibit innova-
tion. 27 Finally, the Chamber argued that rejection of the de-
fense would penalize industries that develop new products. 2 1
In spite of these arguments, which were presented during leg-
islative debates, the Luxembourg parliament rejected the de-
velopment risks defense in its national legislation. 2 9
2. Belgium
As of 1990, Belgium has not complied with the Product
Liability Directive,13 0 and it seems unlikely that the Belgian
122. Projet de Loi relatif i la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits defec-
tueux (Proposed law concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts) Chambre des D6put~s, No. 3287, at 4 (Mar. 1, 1989) (Lux.).
123. Id. at 5 (Oct. 11, 1988).
124. Id. at 5 (Mar. 1, 1989).
125. Id. The Chamber of Commerce represents trade enterprises, but is consid-
ered more than a lobbying group because it gives advice to the government. Tele-
phone Interview with Mr. Cloos, Legal Advisor at the Federation of Luxembourg
Industries in Brussels (Feb. 19, 1990).
126. Projet de Loi relatif i la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits d6fec-
tueux (Proposed law concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts), Chambre des D6put~s, No. 3287, at 10 (Mar. 1, 1989) (Lux.).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Loi du 21 avril 1989 relative la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits
d~fectueux (Law of Apr. 21, 1989 concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of
defective products), DOCUMENT PARLEMENT 3287, SESSION ORDONNANCE 1988-1989
(Lux.).
130. See generally BELGIAN PosrnoN PAPER, supra note 116.
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legislature will adopt the development risks defense.' The
proponents of the development risks defense in Belgium have
argued that exclusion of the defense would increase a pro-
ducer's liability and would lead to an incalculable increase in
insurance premiums for manufacturers. 3 2  The current eco-
nomic situation in Belgium, they argue, is particularly unfavor-
able to increased producer liability.'13 Furthermore, develop-
ment risks defense proponents argue that innovation would be
hindered because producers would subject themselves to in-
creased liability when placing a new product on the market.13 4
This increased liability would prevent manufacturers from de-
veloping new products or would cause a considerable increase
in the price of products.13 5
The Council of Consumers in Brussels has argued that if
the Belgian legislature decides not to adopt the development
risks defense, it should at least impose a duty of vigilance and
notice on producers. 3 6 Additionally, other groups have pro-
posed that the Belgian legislature should look to article 4(l)(e)
of the U.K. Consumer Protection Act for guidance.13 7
3. France
The development risks defense in France is the subject of
much debate due to the direct conflict existing between the Di-
rective and current French law, which provides for strict liabil-
ity, but does not provide for a development risks defense.'
As a result, only draft legislation has been proposed.13 9
131. i at 5 (discussing reluctance of Belgium to adopt development risks de-
fense).
132. Id. (discussing insurance premium increase); see WORKING GROUP REPORT,
supra note 116, at 37.
133. BELGIAN PosIoN PAPER, supra note 116, at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 116, at 35.
137. Id at 39; see Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43, art. 4(l)(e), at 3 (U.K.).
138. CNPF PosIToN PAPER, supra note 118, at 6; LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 32.
139. See Speech by Henri Temple, Professor at the University of Monpellier
(Sept. 21, 1988) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office). A first
draft was produced in March 1988 and a new one was developed in August 1988,
omitting development risks as a defense for producers. Id. In most respects, the
second draft is almost identical to the Products Liability Directive. Id. The draft
legislation in sections 1387-16 adds, however, that the producer is liable even if it
cannot recall a dangerous product from circulation. Id. at 2-3. In addition, the draft
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French jurisprudence dictates, as a general rule, that a pro-
ducer is responsible for unknown defects even if the producer
proves that the defect was not discoverable at the time the
product was put into circulation. 4 °
The French Working Group (the "Working Group"), a
group of French academics in charge of preparing a draft
products liability law, wished to preserve French law and juris-
prudence.' 4 ' The Working Group nevertheless argued that
adoption of the development risks defense could be consid-
ered in conjunction with standards that encourage producers
to increase internal quality controls and to enforce safety stan-
dards.142
Some French commentators argue that incorporating the
development risks defense into national legislation will result
in producers limiting their liability by conducting less research
on product safety. 145 Furthermore, these commentators argue
that the fear of liability will cause producers to band together,
adopting a code of silence regarding defective products and
French legislation does not provide any limitation on liability such as the lower
threshold of ECU 500 provided in the Directive. Id. at 3; see Products Liability Direc-
tive, supra note 2, art. 9(b), OJ. L 210/29, at 31.
140. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 32. Prior to the promulgation
of the Directive, producers were strictly liable for defective products. Id.; see WORK-
ING GROUP REPORT, supra note 116, at 7. The producer, however, is not liable when a
defect does not cause damage. Id. Exceptions to this general rule include defective
labels on medication. Id.
141. See generally WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 116. The Working Group,
headed by Professor Ghestin, was a private group of academics charged by the
French government with preparing draft legislation on products liability. Telephone
Interview with Jolle Simon, Judicial Director of the Conseil National du Patronat
Franqais (Feb. 19, 1990). The Working Group, however, considered that the pro-
ducer should, in certain instances, be able to invoke the development risks defense to
exonerate itself. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 116, at 7. For instance, the
Working Group proposed that a producer should not be liable when damages are not
imputed to a defect in the product, but to a danger such as the mislabeling of medica-
tion. Id. Therefore, the Working Group recommended that French law be modified
in this respect. Id.
142. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 116, at 34. The Working Group ar-
gues that producers can determine the scope of their own liability by not assuming
the risks of development. Id. Furthermore, they argue that theoretically, producers
could also arbitrarily decide to keep any scientific or technological information se-
cret. Id.
143. Rothman & Finon, Responsabilitidu fail des Produits: Vers le Diveloppement D'un
Rigime Defectueux, 124 FICHES JURIDIQUE 6 (1988) (Institute for Consumer Affairs,
France, Pub. No. 610).
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thereby undermining consumer protection. 44 In addition,
commentators note that producers may not disclose scientific
and technological information that would hinder application of
the defense in products liability suits.' 45 This failure to share
scientific and technological information might discourage in-
novation. Moreover, some commentators fear that producers
will systematically invoke the defense, thereby prolonging legal
proceedings and discouraging victims from seeking a rem-
edy.146
Conversely, the Conseil National du Patronat Frangais
(the "Conseil National"), a lobbying group concerned with
promoting the interests of industrial and economic organiza-
tions, tavors a mandatory development risks defense. 47 The
Conseil National theorizes that the optional nature of the de-
velopment risks defense will create competitive distortions
among the producers of the Community, thereby undermining
the Directive's objective of products liability law harmoniza-
tion. 4  This group argues that if the development risks de-
fense remains optional, the variations in the Member States'
laws will hinder the achievement of a common market and en-
courage forum shopping by consumers injured by defective
products.14 9
The Products Liability Directive and, in particular, the de-
velopment risks defense have created controversy in France.
Based on some of the concerns expressed by the Working
Group, the French government is likely to reject the develop-
ment risks defense in its national legislation. 150
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See generally Simon, supra note 63. The Conseil National du Patronat Fran-
ais. (the "Conseil National") is the main organization in France that lobbies in the
French parliament in favor of the industrial, commercial, banking, and economic sec-
tors. Telephone interview with Joelle Simon, Judicial Director of the Conseil Na-
tional (Feb. 19, 1990). Most other Member States have individual lobbying groups
for the industrial sector alone, whereas the Conseil National has over 300 firms as its
members. Id.
148. Simon, supra note 63, at 198.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that
France will exclude development risks defense).
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT RISKS DEFENSE SHOULD BE
MANDATORY WITHIN THE DIRECTIVE
A. The Need for Harmonization
The EEC Treaty provides that the European Economic
Community shall issue directives as a means of approximating
legislation in the European common market.'"' The pursuit of
a European common market, permitting the free flow of goods
and equal competitive opportunities among Member States,
suggests the need for harmonization of Member State prod-
ucts liability laws.' 52 Furthermore, a uniform system of liability
for defective products facilitates equal and adequate consumer
protection. 53
Generally speaking, compliance by all Member States with
EC directives promotes harmonization.'5 4 The Products Lia-
bility Directive, however, promotes disharmony in the Com-
munity by permitting Member States to disregard certain of its
151. EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 100. Article 100 of the EEC Treaty pro-
vides that
[t]he Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Commission, shall issue directives for the approximation of such legislative
and administrative provisions of the Member States as have a direct inci-
dence on the establishment or functioning of the Common Market.
Id. The EEC Treaty further provides that "[it shall be the aim of the Community, by
establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic poli-
cies of Member States to promote throughout the Community a harmonious devel-
opment of economic activities." Id. art. 2.
152. See LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
153. Id. at 31. In addition, adoption of uniform products liability laws among
Member States minimizes competitive distortions. Id.
154. See generally Robinson, Could the Product Liability Directive be Directly Effective in
Ireland Without Implementing Legislation? (copy on file at the Fordham International Law
Journal office) (discussing importance of implementing directives within prescribed
time). The Court of Justice has illustrated this point in numerous cases emphasizing
the importance of harmonization in connection with the promotion of a common
market. See Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, Case 9/70, 1970 E.C.R. 825 (dis-
cussing directive applying common system of turnover tax issued to harmonize na-
tional legislation and to eliminate distortions in connection with promotion of com-
mon transport policy). The Court in Grad stated that the efforts to harmonize Com-
munity legislation cannot be obtained through harmonization measures adopted by
individual Member States at different dates. Id. at 834-35; see Ursula Becker v.
Finanzamt Muinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, 1982 E.C.R. 53, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8789 (deciding that Member State that fails to adopt implementing meas-
ures required by directive within prescribed time may not plead its own failure to
perform obligations of directive).
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provisions. t " Exclusion of the Directive's provisions from na-
tional legislation is inconsistent with the goal of the Directive
and is likely to hinder the free flow of goods.'
56
The Directive's failure to mandate a development risks de-
fense will prove detrimental to the Community. For example,
the Conseil National contends that if France fails to implement
the development risks defense, it will adversely influence the
French economy while giving other countries a competitive ad-
vantage.' 57 France, by excluding the defense, will cause its
producers to avoid experimentation with new products for fear
of liability.'5 8 This fear will enable producers in other Member
States to implement technological advances, thereby gaining a
competitive advantage in certain products and methods of pro-
duction. 59
The Chamber of Commerce in Luxembourg expressed
155. BRITISH DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, IMPLEMENTATION OF EC DI-
RECTIVE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY 5 (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter DTI POSITION PAPER]; see
Products Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 15, O.J. L 210/29, at 32. Commenta-
tors have argued that the optional nature of certain articles within the Directive
leaves key issues, such as limitations on liability, to the discretion of the Member
States. See, e.g., Zekoll, supra note 104, at 815. Furthermore, commentators argue
that this variation will cause Member States to depend on local laws that provide a
wide range of varying solutions. Id. at 816. Moreover, the vague wording of some of
the Directive's provisions will create conflicting interpretations in the various Mem-
ber States, thereby creating disharmony. Id.
Mr. Patrick Thieffry argues that the options set forth in the Directive will be
detrimental to the unification of products liability laws throughout the Community.
Thieffiy, supra note 44, at 48. Mr. Thieffry argues that
[e]ven when all Member States have finally incorporated the Directive in
their national laws, their provisions will remain somewhat different, because
of the options opened to the Member States .... If the law of the Federal
Republic of Germany is applicable, for example, the overall liability of a
producer for identical items with the same defect shall be limited to 160
million Ecu. Furthermore, primary agricultural products and game will ap-
parently be subject to the Directive's system in France and in Luxembourg
and-as far as it is possible to expect at the time of this paper-not in other
Member States.
Id.
156. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 29. The European Parliament ad-
vised that "if Member States are allowed to lay down [certain] implementing provi-
sions, this would undoubtedly lead to divergence in the application and consequent
cost to producers of the principle of products liability. The proposal is, therefore,
not fully in line with the intended objective of bringing about equal competitive op-
portunities in the Community." Id.
157. Simon, supra note 63, at 202.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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similar concerns.'6° By excluding the defense, Luxembourg is
isolating itself from the rest of the Community and will be at a
disadvantage with respect to its partners and competitors.' 6 '
To avoid potential liability, investors will avoid contributing
money to new technologies, thereby stifling innovation.
62
Furthermore, the United Kingdom's implementation of
the development risks defense significantly undermines the ob-
jective of the Directive.' 63 Because the United Kingdom has
adopted its own standard for producer liability, the United
Kingdom's implementation of the Directive will not achieve
the goal of harmonization.164 Article 4(l)(e) of the Consumer
Protection Act imposes a reasonableness standard, reducing
the development risks defense to a negligence test.' 65 Addi-
tionally, this standard creates the likelihood that a future body
of case law will develop in the United Kingdom that fails to
conform with the Directive.166 Such a development would fur-
ther undermine the underlying interests of the Products Liabil-
ity Directive. 16
7
The goal of the Products Liability Directive is consistent
with the Treaty's intentions to harmonize the Community mar-
ket."6 Exclusion of the development risks defense in Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom undermines
the intentions of the EEC Treaty and promotes disharmony in
the Community.
160. See Projet de Loi relatif A la responsabilit6 civile du fait des produits d~fec-
tueux (Proposed law concerning civil liability of manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts), Chambre de Dkput6s, No. 3287, at 7 (Mar. 1, 1989) (Lux.).
161. Id
162. Id. at 10.
163. See Dehn, supra note 108, at 5 (discussing United Kingdom's controversial
implementation of Products Liability Directive).
164. Id.
165. Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43, art. 4(l)(e), at 3 (U.K.); see
Nedwick, supra note 110, at 459.
166. See Dehn, supra note 108, at 5.
167. Id.
168. See EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 2. Article 2 provides that
[i]t shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stabil-
ity, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations be-
tween the States belonging to it.
1990-1991]
506 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:478
B. The Development Risks Defense is Favorable to the European
Community
A mandatory development risks defense would harmonize
the products liability laws in the Community, thereby creating
a free flowing market devoid of competitive distortions. 69 A
uniform products liability law eliminates the possibility of a
producer being subjected to a variety of products liability
laws.' 70 Producers will not have to fear exporting goods to
Member States with more stringent products liability laws.' 7 '
The resulting free flow of goods will enable the market to run
more smoothly. 72
Some opponents argue that the development risks defense
will enable producers to exercise complete control over their
industry.'17 By arbitrarily not disclosing certain scientific and
technical knowledge, an entire industry can choose to ignore
improvements in their products, thereby stifling beneficial in-
novation. 174
Innovation, however, can also be stifled by not adopting
the development risks defense. 175 For example, producers will
avoid creating new products that will be only marginally profit-
able because they are not widely utilized or in high demand,
and will innovate in only the most profitable markets. 176 Fur-
thermore, there is little evidence that innovation has been sti-
fled in those Member States that have implemented the de-
fense. 177
Proponents of the development risks defense argue that
rejecting the defense will cause insurance rates to rise.' 7 8 They
169. LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 31-32.
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id.
172. Id. Otherwise, manufacturers will be reluctant to sell innovative products
in countries where the legal environment is hostile. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at
3. This is a significant problem in the medical field where products liability claims
are most prevalent. Id. at 4.
173. Burke Speech, supra note 71, at 10.
174. Schmitz, EEC Council Directive Liabihty for Defective Products: A Consumer View-
point, Bureau Europien Des Unions De Consommateurs, (BEUC) doc. 39/86, at 4 (Feb. 27,
1986).
175. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at 3.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at 5. Certain industries, particularly in the
areas of pharmaceuticals and aircraft, complained that to exclude development risks
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fear that the cost of insurance will be so high that only produ-
cers in economically strong companies will be able to insure
themselves.' 79 Moreover, producers who are unaware of de-
fects in products lack the ability to calculate liability risks, re-
sulting in the inability to calculate insurance premiums.180 Op-
ponents of the defense, however, argue that insurance premi-
ums do not differ significantly between countries that cover
risks of development and those that do not.' Furthermore,
industrialists need not worry because consumers appear will-
ing to pay more to cover producers' insurance costs. 182
In addition, exclusion of the defense will aggravate the
problem of forum shopping.'8 " Multi-national corporations
that sell goods throughout the EC will be sued in the Member
would prove to be more burdensome to their industries than others. Burke Speech,
supra note 71, at 10. This is true because side effects of pharmaceuticals or cosmetics
are often, in spite of intensive testing, technically or scientifically not capable of being
detected. See Lousanoff & Moessle, supra note 75, at 674. Because the unique liability
problems in these industries have been in existence for so long, however, legal solu-
tions already have been developed to resolve them. See Burke Speech, supra note 71,
at 10.
179. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at 5.
180. See Proposal to Dutch Amendment, supra note 95; see also supra note 95 and
accompanying text (discussing insurance premiums).
181. Rothman & Finon, supra note 143, at 6. Insurers propose that any increase
in insurance costs subsequent to the Directive's implementation would be minimal.
Id. The American Chamber of Commerce in Europe (the "EUROMED") agreed that
insurance coverage for development risks is not likely to appreciate. AMERICAN
CHAMBER IN ITALY, ITALIAN-AMERICAN BUSINESS (Nov. 1980) (copy on file at the Ford-
ham International Law Journal office). EUROMED, however, submitted that premiums
would be significantly higher with respect to pharmaceuticals that are inherently and
unavoidably unsafe. Id. at 56.
182. CBI REPORT, supra note 112, at 4. The Association of Insurance Managers
in Industry and Commerce (the "AIRMIC"), which represents those responsible for
buying insurance on behalf of their companies, urged the inclusion of a development
risks defense in the Directive. Id. at 5. AIRMIC advised that
[w]hile manufacturers and suppliers are prepared to accept responsibility
for their products, they cannot realistically fund these liabilities without in-
surance protection .... If, as we know is the case, the insurance industry is
not able to provide the cover that we need at present, one must question
their ability to provide cover under a strict liability regime, let alone one
without a development risks defence.
Id.
183. See Proposal to Dutch Amendment, supra note 95; see also supra note 95 and
accompanying text (discussing problems of forum shopping resulting from optional
development risks defense).
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States most likely to award the greatest recovery." -
Originally, the European Parliament argued for the elimi-
nation of the development risks defense to protect consum-
ers.'" 5 The Commission, however, in its explanatory memo-
randum on the amended proposal, argued that exclusion of
the defense would require consumers to bear the risk of the
unknown.' 86 Furthermore, the Union des Industries de la Com-
munauti Europene, a group that lobbies on behalf of consumer
interests, stated that when products are placed on the market,
manufacturers are obliged by the law in all Member States to
take all necessary measures to protect the consumer once they
realize that their products are defective.'8 7 Moreover, the de-
velopment risks defense allows consumers to be compensated
more readily because cases will be tried in court with more ex-
pediency. 188
CONCLUSION
The Council of Ministers set specific goals when it imple-
mented the Products Liability Directive. The goal of the Prod-
ucts Liability Directive is to protect consumers in the EC while
advancing toward the European economic union of 1992. The
adoption of a mandatory development risks defense would
promote both the goals of the Directive and the goal of Euro-
pean economic union, while allowing producers to innovate
and improve their products. The optional development risks
defense in article 15 of the Products Liability Directive, how-
ever, undermines these goals. The defense should be
184. Proposal to Dutch Amendment, supra note 96 (discussing problems associ-
ated with exclusion of development risks defense).
185. UNION DES INDUSTRIES DE LA COMMUNAUTI EUROPAENE (UNICE), PosmoN
PAPER ON THE AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3 (Jan.
16, 1980) [hereinafter UNICE POSITION PAPER].
186. Amended Proposal, supra note 8, at 4; see UNICE POSITION PAPER, supra
note 185, at 3. The BEUC, a lobbying group for European consumers, argued that
European judges do not have much experience in products liability cases. Schmitz,
supra note 174, at 4. More than ninety-five percent of European products liability
cases settle out of court. Id. By encouraging out of court settlements, the BEUC
argues that the development risks defense will be beneficial to manufacturers be-
cause it leads to favorable results. Id.
187. UNICE POSITION PAPER, supra note 185, at 3.
188. Schmitz, supra note 174, at 4.
1990-1991] PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE 509
mandatory in order to promote innovation and to create a
common market with minimal competitive distortions.
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